US Army War College

USAWC Press
Articles & Editorials
10-15-2014

Strategic Insights: The U.S. Foray Into The Levant
Sami G. Hajjar

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Hajjar, Sami G., "Strategic Insights: The U.S. Foray Into The Levant" (2014). Articles & Editorials. 417.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials/417

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Editorials by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

Strategic Insights: The U.S. Foray Into
The Levant
October 15, 2014 | Dr. Sami G. Hajjar

The Levant is caught up in a web of political, social, and economic problems that seem to
be the work of the hidden hand of the devil. The U.S. Air Force, and those of Bahrain,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Jordan are actively bombing
positions of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS by substituting “Syria”
for “Levant”)—an immediate and critical component of the Barack Obama
administration’s strategy to “degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a
comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.”1 A corollary to the air campaign
is to arm the Kurdish security forces, arm and train the Syrian Free Army, retrain units of
the Iraqi Army, and stand up an Iraqi national guard unit made up of Iraqi Sunni
elements—all to combat ISIL on the ground. The other elements of the strategy involve
using U.S. counterterrorism capabilities, including intelligence, to prevent ISIL attacks,
and to provide humanitarian assistance to affected civilians who have been the victims of
ISIL terror.
The high profile of U.S. military engagement in the Levant will eventually come to an
end. At that time, and as is customary, the United States will declare victory and attempt
to exit gracefully, while pronouncing its enduring commitment and support to our
regional allies.
As the United States and its Arab and Western allies rejoice in their victory over ISIL,
knowledgeable Arab observers are likely to argue that the Levant’s merry-go-round has
just dropped off ISIL and will now await new “riders” that are sure to appear. After all, the
number of radical Islamic groups has been on the rise in the past few years, and unless
the deeper issues that lie beneath the phenomenon of religious extremism and fanaticism
are addressed, the trend is likely to continue.

Granted, most of these issues are well known and generations to come will need to
cope with such issues. In part, the Arab Spring that erupted 4 years ago was a populist call
to replace autocratic political regimes, and to introduce social and economic reforms as
means to a better future for the Arab people. The hopes of the Arab Spring have, by and
large, faltered, and radical Islamic ideologues have burst out on the scene with violent
vengefulness.
But the most critical of these issues today is the question of identity. Without assigning
blame, the fact is that outsiders have defined both the geography and demography of the
modern Middle East, especially the Levant. The inhabitants of the Arab world were
organized into states following the demise of the Ottoman Empire with little or no regard
to their tribal, ethnic, or sectarian affiliations—and with no regard to their wishes. After
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it became fashionable to speak of Sunnis, Shi’a, Kurds,
Christians, Turkoman, and so on.
The one political identity that once was a common denominator that made little or no
distinction between religious sects, tribal or ethnic differences, namely "Arab
nationalism," was discarded following the Arab defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel,
and replaced with local nationalism “wataniyyah” as a means to thwart the rise of one
unified Arab nation that could threaten Western interests in the region.
In the current environment in the region, Arabism defined broadly to mean the
national identity of the inhabitants of the Arab world, regardless of religious, tribal or
ethnic affiliations, who share a common language and history, but also a destiny that
binds them together, is the only viable alternative to religious extremism that views
identity through a narrow sectarian prism. It is this secular and broad meaning of
Arabism that led Shimon Peres, the former president of Israel, to suggest that Israel could
one day join the Arab League.
The frequent exhortations that extremist Muslims are distorting the true and peaceful
message of Islam are not likely to dissuade those who chose the radical path and who
believe in the interpretations of Islamic texts of salafi religious scholars such as Ibn
Taymiyya. The attempt to get conservative and radical Muslims to accept a more liberal
and tolerant form of Islam is a futile exercise of competing arguments that have no higher
referent to adjudicate between them.
The Obama administration should seriously consider the possibility of establishing a
U.S. Informational and Cultural Services Agency (USICSA) somewhat similar to the now
defunct U.S. Information Agency. Unlike the latter whose main mission was to explain
America’s foreign policy to the rest of the world and to promote American values and
culture during the Cold War years, USICSA additionally would become the principal
agency for strategic communication to deal with anti-terrorism programs (vice

counterterrorism, which is a reference to military actions against terrorists) designed to
promote a culture of tolerance and diversity. It should be professionally staffed and be
both a “joint” and “coalition” agency. Members of the military, State Department,
intelligence agencies, and others with relevant expertise such as public affairs, public
diplomacy, strategic communication, and the like, could be assigned to the agency for a
tour of duty. USICSA should heavily engage coalition partners who understand best their
and the region’s publics and how best to address them. Above all, the effort should be
guided by a strategic communication doctrine, by continually planning and adjusting
informational and cultural strategies, and to execute them as war plans with operations
and tactics that are derived from and in support of each strategy. It should be an effort
distinct from the existing ad hoc, haphazard, disparate, and competing programs aimed
at “changing hearts and minds” on which various departments, agencies and centers of
the U.S. Government waste taxpayers’ dollars.
When the United States and its allies pursue a policy grounded in the realities of the
Levant, perhaps then the merry go-round could be replaced with a forward moving
conveyance.
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